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ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING
IN NUCLEAR FACILITIES LICENSING
DAvID F. CAvFns t
In discharging its most important regulatory function-the licens-
ing of nuclear facilities (mainly reactors)-the United States Atomic
Energy Commission has encountered two difficult and serious prob-
lems. One is how to create and maintain public confidence in the
objectivity of its decisions as to the safety of the facilities it licenses.
The other is how to assure, as nearly as possible, the validity of those
decisions--decisions which often involve scientific and engineering
judgments of an exceedingly difficult and recondite character. Solu-
tions to both of these problems must take into account the fact that,
in addition to its regulatory duties, the AEC is charged with adminis-
tering a vast military procurement and development program and with
promoting and developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy, includ-
ing, of course, the promotion and development of atomic power.
The Commission has sought to warrant the objectivity of its de-
cisions by judicializing the licensing process, that is, by carefully ob-
serving procedural formalities and isolating the hearing examiner and
even the Commission itself from its own technical staff.1 And it has
sought to assure the technical validity of safety decisions reached at
the prehearing stage of the licensing process by supplementing the
views of its technical staff with those of the statutory Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), a fifteen-man, part-time body
of scientists and engineers which advises the Commission on the basis
of very informal inquiries.
The success of these measures is at best questionable. Judicializa-
tion of the licensing process can scarcely reassure a worried community
j-Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.S. 1923, University of
Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1926, Harvard University. The views expressed in this article
are the personal views of the author and not necessarily those of the staff of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, with which he has been associated as consultant
in its study of the AEC's regulatory process.
I The procedure governing AEC licensing of facilities is outlined, with illustrative
case histories, in 1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 87TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PRocEss 19-24, 27-40 (Jt Comm. Print
1961) [hereinafter cited as JCAE STAFF STUDY]. For a more complete description,
with detailed case chronologies, see AEC, The Regulatory Program of the Atomic
Energy Comnnission [hereinafter cited as AEC's Regulatory Program], in 2 JCAE
STAFF STUDY 87-393. For an excellent treatment which is historical and evaluative
as well as descriptive, see BERMAN & HYDEMAN, THE ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMIssION
AND REGULATING NUCLEAR FACiLCIES 64-154 (1961) [hereinafter cited as BERMAN
& HYDEmAN]. For the pertinent regulations, see 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.814 (1959) (rules
of practice), §§ 50.1-.110 (1959) (licensing of production and utilization facilities).
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that the Commission, which in its promotional and developmental
functions has been encouraging and even agreeing to subsidize 2 an
applicant before the licensing process has begun, will achieve disinter-
ested detachment when the application for a construction permit reaches
it some months or years later, bearing the approval of both its own
staff and the ACRS. Although the prehearing process for evaluating
safety is good, if currently cumbersome, there is no effective review of
the merits of the safety decisions it produces in the absence of inter-
vention by a third party, and intervention is so costly and time-consum-
ing that it can seldom be expected to take place. Moreover, even if
intervention does occur, the present procedure is likely to impair the
effectiveness of the review.
The present procedures have another complaint to answer: they
are so time-consuming and costly to the applicant that they are likely
to deter entry into the still economically unattractive atomic power
industry. Moreover, although the Commission has made extensive
delegations of its regulatory functions, the Commissioners report that
they have been devoting from one-sixth to one-third of their time to
regulatory matters 3 and yet "concede that in the past" the Commission
"was slow in developing rules and regulations for the licensing of
utilization facilities and materials." '
These inadequacies have led to extensive study of the AEC's
regulatory structure and procedures. The Commission began to en-
counter difficulties in passing on the safety of nuclear facilities within
two years of the adoption of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,' the
statute which first authorized nongovernmental reactors. In 1956 the
problem of public confidence came to the fore with the United Auto
Workers' intervention to contest the grant of a conditional construction
permit to the Power Reactor Development Company to build a Fermi
fast-breeder reactor on the shores of Lake Erie about midway between
Detroit and Toledo. Soon thereafter, a study of the AEC regulatory
process was begun by the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic
2The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 forbids direct subsidization, § 169, 68 Stat.
952, 42 U.S.C. § 2209 (1958), but permits research assistance, § 31, 68 Stat. 927,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2051 (1958), and the waiver of charges for the use of
nuclear fuel, § 53(c), 68 Stat. 930, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2071(c) (1958), both
running into many millions of dollars. This system was termed "'no subsidy' sub-
sidization"' in Cavers, Atomic Power: The Quest for a Program, 27 Gao. WAsH. L.
Ray. 427, 457 (1959).
a Letter From AEC Commissioner J. S. Graham to James T. Ramey, Executive
Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Oct. 28, 1960, in 2 JCAE STAY,
STUDy 574.
4 Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
Radiation Safety and Regulation].
5 68 Stat. 919 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-281 (1958), as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2016-203 (Supp. II, 1961).
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Energy, and, in response to its recommendations,' amendments to the
Atomic Energy Act were enacted in 1957, making public hearings
mandatory in the licensing of power and test reactors 7 giving statutory
status to the ACRS,5 and requiring it to make public reports concern-
ing the safety of proposed reactors.9
I. THREE RECENT STUDIES
Since the 1957 Joint Committee staff report, experience in the
licensing of nuclear facilities has grown much greater and, of course,
reflects changes made in response to the 1957 amendments. Last year
the timeliness of a new look at the system's operation was remarked
both by Senator Clinton Anderson, then Chairman of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, and by the then Chairman of the AEC,
John A. McCone.'0 Two government-sponsored studies ensued: a
self-study by the AEC" and a new study by the Joint Committee
staff, 2 in which the author participated as a consultant, together with
William Mitchell, former General Counsel of the AEC. About the
same time the codirectors of the Atomic Energy Project of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School, William H. Berman and Lee M.
Hydeman, instituted a study of the same subject.' 3 All three studies
6 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 85TH CONG., lsT Sass., A STUDY
OF AEC PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION IN THE LICENSING OF REACTOR FACILITIES
25, 33, 34 (Jt. Comm. Print 1957).
7 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 189(a), as amended, 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42
U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1958). A hearing after thirty days' notice published in the Federal
Register is required only for: (1) facilities for which § 103, 68 Stat. 936 (1954), 42
U.S.C. § 2133 (1958), requires "commercial licenses" (none as yet has been sought),
(2) facilities "involved in the conduct of research and development activities leading
to the demonstration of the practical value of such facilities for industrial or com-
mercial purposes," § 104(b), 68 Stat. 937 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2134(b) (1958), which
is the legal basis for the nonmilitary power reactors licensed to date; and (3) test
reactors-used for testing materials under radiation-licensed under § 104(c), 68 Stat.
937, 42 U.S.C. § 2134(c) (1958). Licensing of research reactors and "critical as-
semblies" (devices maintaining a fission chain reaction at virtually zero power level)
has been delegated to the AEC Division of Licensing and Regulation. See AEC
MANUAL § 0103-083 (Feb. 1960). Reference to the ACRS is discretionary in licensing
proceedings as to which no hearing is required. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 182(b),
added by 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2232(b) (1958). In such proceedings,
licenses take effect thirty days after notice published in the Federal Register unless
intervention or a public hearing is requested.
8 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §29, added by 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C.
§2039 (1958).
9 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 182(b), added by 71 Stat. 579 (1957), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2232(b) (1958).
10 This background is reported in 1 JCAE STAF STUDY 7-9. See also Holifield,
Foreword to id. at v.
"AEC's Regulatory Program, in 2 JCAE STAFF STUDY 87-393; AEC, Report
on the Regulatory Program of the Atomic Energy Commission [hereinafter cited as
Report m the Regulatory Program], in 2 JCAE STAFF STUDY 395-423.
121 JCAE STAFF STUDY.
13 See note 1 .upra.
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were completed early in 1961 and formed the subject of hearings
before the Joint Committee in mid-June 1961.
Although these studies also considered the AEC's extensive ac-
tivities in the licensing of nuclear materials and of nuclear waste dis-
posal, their main concern was with the licensing of nuclear facilities.
This article will similarly be directed to facilities licensing and will
discuss the two problems noted at its start. It will draw extensively on
the three studies and on the Joint Committee hearings. The respective
positions of the studies on basic issues of licensing may be summarized
as follows:
The AEC study recommended continuation of the Commission's
present regulatory structure and procedures, with internal changes to
facilitate action on regulatory matters by the Commission, and modi-
fication of the 1957 amendments to make a public hearing mandatory
only at the construction permit stage, absent intervention and the
existence of "substantial novel safety questions." 14 The study in-
timates that possibly, in the absence of such questions, reference to the
ACRS might also be dispensed with. 5
The Joint Committee staff study recommended that a three-
member "Atomic Safety and Licensing Board" be created within the
framework of the AEC, to be appointed by the President and au-
thorized to make final dispositions-subject only to judicial review-
in all licensing proceedings under the Atomic Energy Act and in
authorization proceedings involving Government-owned nonmilitary
reactors.' 6 Two of the members would be "technically qualified."
Rulemaking power would be retained by the Commission, though the
Board would be consulted. The study's proposals for relaxing the
requirements for public hearings and reference to the ACRS were
similar to those advanced in the AEC study."
The Berman-Hydeman study proposed that a similar three-
member board be created in a separate agency to which the AEC's
'4 Report on the Regulatory Program, in 2 JCAE STAFF STUDY 410.
15 Id. at 406.
10 Presumably this board would delegate research reactor licensing to the staff.
See also note 7 supra. An important problem not yet wholly solved is the review
to be given three types of power and test reactors not subject to the licensing process:
reactors built by the AEC for public or cooperative electric systems, to which the
AEC retains title; reactors built by the AEC for its own use on its own sites; and
reactors built by or for other federal departments or agencies. For reactors in the
first category, the prime contractor must get from the AEC a "construction authoriza-
tion!' and an "operating authorization"' b y following procedures paralleling those for
reactors not owned by the AEC, including reference to the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safety (ACRS) and public hearings. See Procedures for Review of Certain
Nuclear Reactors Exempted from Licensing Requirements, 26 Fed. Reg. 4321 (1961).
These procedures could be extended (with appropriate modifications) to nonmilitary
reactors in the second two categories, as is being done for the U.S. Maritime Ad-
ministration's N. S. Savannah.
17 For a summary of the staff's plan, see 1 JCAE STAFF STuny 69-75.
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present regulatory powers and staff would be transferred. The study
also recommended replacing the Commission with an Atomic Energy
Administrator, who would participate in rulemaking by the Board.
The sharing of space and certain services were suggested to preserve
contact between the two agency staffs. The study recommended that
the requirement of a public hearing be retained in uncontested cases,
but that it be reexamined in two or three years and restricted in the
interim to a single hearing at the construction permit stage.18
II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: THE PEACH BOTTOM REACTOR
The problems that have led to the foregoing proposals can be
made concrete by reference to a pending proceeding-the Philadelphia
Electric Company's application to construct an advanced high-tempera-
ture, helium-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor of 40,000 kilowatts, at
Peach Bottom, York County, Pennsylvania. 9
The Peach Bottom reactor proposal was made in response to an
invitation by the AEC in September 1958 to the electric industry to
construct, with AEC aid for research and fuel costs, a gas-cooled
reactor. The act authorizing the construction fixed a deadline of sixty
days for the receipt of private bids, and, if no satisfactory bids were
received or negotiations thereafter failed, the AEC itself was to build
the reactor and use the electric energy it generated."0 Just before the
sixty-day deadline, the Peach Bottom proposal was filed by Philadel-
phia Electric together with High Temperature Reactor Development
Associates, Inc., a hastily assembled nonprofit institution comprising
fifty-two "investor-owned" electric utility companies."' The proposal
was not wholly responsive to the invitation, but, rather than lose the
chance for a new partnership with the electric industry, the AEC
persuaded the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to sponsor legis-
lation clearing the way for the Peach Bottom reactor. This was
needed, for, while the bidders were prepared to invest an aggregate of
$24,500,000, the United States was requested to agree to supply
$15,000,000 for research and $2,000,000 by the waiver for five years
of the four per cent use charge on nuclear fuel supplied for the reactor
Is For the authors' plan, see BERMAN & HYDEMAN 319-31. The Board would
also serve as "a focal point" for the various radiation control responsibilities of the
federal government, superseding the Federal Radiation Council, an interagency body
given statutory recognition in 1959. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 274(h), added by
73 Stat. 690 (1959), 42 U.S.C. §2021(h) (Supp. II, 1961).
19 In the Matter of Philadelphia Elec. Co., No. 50-171, AEC, July 25, 1960.
20 Act of Aug. 4, 1958, § 110, 72 Stat 494.
21 For a brief account of its genesis, see Hearings on AEC Authorization Legis.
lation Fiscal Year 1960 Before the Subcommittee on Legislation of the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1959).
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by the United States, the only lawful owner of the kind of fuel needed.
Having obtained the necessary authorization' and appropriation, the
AEC then negotiated contracts with Philadelphia Electric and its
investment partner, and with General Dynamics Corporation, which
was to do the research and development work on the project.
Obviously this sequence of events required repeated and careful
attention by the Commission and protracted study and negotiation by
its staff. Not only was the possibility of a significant advance in power
reactor design at stake, but, in creating High Temperature Reactor
Development Associates, Inc., "private power" had rallied its forces to
fend off the menace of another government owned and operated electric
power plant, an effort to which both the Administration and the
Commission were warmly sympathetic. Clearly, then, in its capacity
as promoter and developer, the Commission was deeply committed to
Peach Bottom.
Since the signing of the contract in August 1959,21 work on
design has been going forward, and various subcontracts have been
let. But to obtain the permit required by section 185 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 195424 before commencing construction, Philadelphia
Electric has had to approach the Commission once more, this time not
as the AEC's invitee or as its associate in a common venture, but as an
applicant seeking a decision that "a reactor of the general type pro-
posed can be constructed and operated at the Peach Bottom site without
undue risk to the health and safety of the public." 25 At this stage
applicants must deal with the AEC's Division of Licensing and Regula-
tion, not with the Division of Reactor Development.
Well before the Peach Bottom reactor design was far enough
along to sustain an application for a construction permit, Philadelphia
Electric sought preliminary indications from the ACRS as to the
suitability of its site. Although several cities are within a twenty-five
mile radius of the reactor,26 the ACRS concluded that the "site pro-
vides a generally acceptable degree of isolation when considered in
22Act of June 23, 1959, § 110(f), 73 Stat. 85. Since a 1957 amendment to §261
of the act, 71 Stat. 274 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 2017 (1958), cooperative power demon-
stration programs have required authorizations for appropriations.
23 AEC Release No. B-145, Aug. 27, 1959.
24 68 Stat. 954, 42 U.S.C. § 2235 (1958).
2 5This is the key finding to be made when a provisional construction permit is
sought. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (1959).
26 For the site data, see Hearings on AEC Authorization Legislation Fiscal Year
1960, .supra note 21, at 79-80. The proposed site is located in a relatively thinly popu-
lated area on the Susquehanna River (4,000 people within a radius of 5 miles), within
19 miles of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 22 miles of York, Pennsylvania, and about 25
miles from Baltimore, Maryland, which, in order to supplement its present supply,
proposes to draw water from the Susquehanna River above the big Conowingo Dam,
the intake being about nine miles downstream from the site.
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relation to the proposed high integrity containment." 27 On further
review, after the Company had applied for a construction permit, the
ACRS, though recognizing that the "initial results" of the "extensive
research and development program related to this reactor . . . appear
to be favorable," identified a series of unresolved questions "in areas
which could require major changes in the present design concepts and
could conceivably change our early optimism." It declined, therefore,
"to go beyond its original conclusion" as to the suitability of the site."
Rumblings of concern were heard in the vicinage. Shortly after
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled against the
use of a conditional construction permit in the Power Reactor Dev. Co.
case 29-- a decision later reversed by the Supreme Court ° 3 -then-
Congressman James M. Quigley wrote the AEC asserting his agree-
ment with the Court of Appeals decision and declaring that "the time
to resolve any threat to public safety . . .is now and not after millions
of dollars of the taxpayers' money have been spent. . . "" And
Dr. C. L. Wilbar, Pennsylvania Secretary of Health, wrote the com-
pany for more data on certain design problems, including several not
raised in the ACRS or AEC statements, and declared that his depart-
ment would have to intervene if these were not forthcoming.3
In April 1961 the AEC's Division of Licensing and Regulation
ruled by letter that the information submitted by the company did not
warrant issuance of a construction permit and noted lines along which
further research and development data were needed, much the same
lines as the ACRS had already indicated.'
After the new data had been furnished, representatives of the
applicant, the contractor, and the AEC staff met with a subcommittee
of the ACRS on October 3, 1961, and with the full committee on
October 27. In a letter dated November 1, the ACRS advised Chair-
man Seaborg of the AEC that "since the continuing research program
gives reasonable assurance that all health and safety problems can be
satisfactorily resolved, the ACRS believes . . ." (and here follows the
key finding noted above) that there is "reasonable assurance that it [the
27 Report of Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, United States Atomic
Energy Commission, in 2 CCH ATOM. ENMRGY L. REP. 10396 (March 14, 1960).
28 See AEC Release No. C-259, Dec. 23, 1960.
2 9 International Union of Elec. Workers v. United States, 280 F.2d 645 (D.C.
Cir. 1960).
So Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S.
396 (1961).
316 AToMIc IND. REP., NE S AND ANALYSIS 271 (1960).
32 Id. at 336.
3 Letter From Robert Lowenstein, Acting Director of the Division of Licensing
and Regulation, to the Philadelphia Electric Company, April 15, 1961.
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reactor] can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of
the public." "
The ACRS letter is longer than is customary; it devotes a page
to listing various design improvements adding to safety and briefly
identifies the two points as to which the research and development
program gives the "reasonable assurance" it reports. With respect to
one of these, it makes the comforting notation that "should later results
indicate that a reliable system can not be obtained by the present ap-
proach, alternate methods appear to be available" to achieve the
desired purpose. 5
No doubt the AEC staff shares the ACRS's views. Two weeks
after receiving them, the Division of Licensing and Regulation pub-
lished notice that a public hearing would be held on December 18, 1961,
at AEC headquarters in Germantown, Maryland."8 If the company
had failed to get the staff approval that can be inferred from this
notice, its chances of obtaining a favorable decision by pressing its
case before the hearing examiner or on appeal to the Commission
would have been slight. But now that this approval has been won,
certain events can be predicted with some assurance.
The staff of the Division of Licensing and Regulation will at
once be "separated for the purposes of the case from both the Com-
mission and the hearing examiner." At the hearing the applicant and
the staff will doubtless offer testimony in support of the application.
Conceivably Representative Quigley's successor will seek to intervene
and be permitted to do so, but the Supreme Court's decision in the
Power Reactor Dev. Co. case has left him with no legal basis for
34 See AEC Release No. D-303, Nov. 7, 1961.
35 The ACRS's reference to the alternative bears on a problem suggested by the
Power Reactor Dev. Co. case, in which the AEC's finding of "reasonable assurance"
was sustained although research essential to a final determination of the safety of the
general type of reactor there involved remained to be completed. The Commission's
statement that its finding was "for the purposes of the provisional construction permit"
was said by the Supreme Court to be "merely declaratory of the nature of the pro-
ceeding" so that it "in no way denigrated the finding as to safety of operation."
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 410
(1961). Yet the Commission's phrase highlights the fact that neither the statute nor
the regulations restrain the optimism with which the AEC may view the prospects
of incomplete yet essential research or development work. If the purpose of the
act's two-stage licensing process is to be preserved, it may sometimes be necessary
to require a finding as to the existence of a safe and practicable alternative way to
solve a problem which the applicant is seeking to solve by a method the safety of
which is still being studied. See Berman & Hydeman, Licensing Reactor Facilities,
2 ATom. ExanGy L.J. 105, 133 (1960), in which the authors say that a finding of
reasonable assurance that the research questions are likely to be resolved favorably
should be sufficient.
86See 26 Fed. Reg. 10736 (1961). Ten days before the hearing, the AEC
sponsored an informal public meeting at Delta, Pa., to discuss its regulatory system
and safety questions concerning the Peach Bottom plant. The meeting, attended by
about 160 persons, mostly citizens of the area, is said to be viewed by the AEC as
a "success" from "the public information point of view." Forum Memo 3an. 1962, p. 23.
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objecting to a provisional permit, and what can he say to alter the
findings that the staff and applicant are ready to write for the exam-
iner? And what can the examiner do other than to accept the
proffered findings-save in the unlikely event that some sloppy staff
work should leave a point uncovered? Even if the State Health De-
partment intervenes (an improbable contingency when both the AEC
staff and the ACRS are satisfied), it too is unlikely to undermine the
applicant's case; at best the Department may get some additional con-
ditions written into the permit, to be satisfied before an operating
license is granted. Unless, therefore, some anxious and militant citi-
zens' group can afford to enlist a good lawyer and can find a group
of competent nuclear physicists who are able and willing to take issue
with the staff and the ACRS, the company will have cleared the first
hurdle on the road to an operating license. Absent exceptions to the
examiner's order, the Commission will look at the record of the public
hearing, aided by a summary prepared by counsel assigned to the
Commission by the General Counsel for aid in licensing cases.37 It
will almost certainly approve the order; the Commission simply cannot
dig back into the primary data and the applicant's discussions with the
staff and the ACRS so as to get to the bottom of the problems they
have resolved in the applicant's favor.
Two or three years and many meetings later, the applicant may
have completed constructing the reactor and be prepared, by satisfying
the conditions prescribed in the construction permit, to show that it is
entitled to an operating license. Again this can be done only if it can
convince the staff and the ACRS that the data derived from further
research and development or design modifications have provided the
needed safety assurance. Probably the new picture will not be free
from ambiguity; doubts will have to be resolved; but there seems little
chance that the Commission which had provided large-scale aid and
had allowed the reactor to be completely constructed would suddenly
override the judgment of its staff and the ACRS and convert a
$50,000,000 ready-to-run reactor into an historical monument. If
either the staff or the ACRS did not believe that the operating license
should issue, maybe the company would contest that position; possibly,
after the protracted ceremony of a hearing before an examiner and the
filing of his intermediate opinion, the company could persuade the
Commission to issue the operating license it sought, perhaps on some
provisional basis.3  Having made the investment, the company would
3 1lHearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 312-14 (testimony of Commis-
sioner Olson).
38 The AEC regulations have been recently amended to authorize "provisional
operating licenses." See 10 C.F.R. § 50.57 (Supp. 1961).
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have little to lose by appeal, and the technical issues might well be of
a sort that could be resolved reasonably in either direction.
The Peach Bottom case is somewhat more troublesome than the
usual reactor licensing proceeding, in that the Commission's involve-
ment in preapplication dealings with the applicant has been greater
than is typical, and the reactor itself poses more than the usual number
of safety questions. However, the adequacy of a regulatory process
is not to be gauged simply by its aptness for the run-of-the-mill case,
and the complications of Peach Bottom are by no means unique.
III. THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMISSION'S DUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
The AEC's own study views the conflict caused by the Commis-
sion's dual responsibility as adequately met by the separation of the
staff and the basing of Commission decisions on the record before the
examiner. It also stresses the need for weighing development and
safety considerations together in reaching a final policy judgment.
On the basic question whether it is wise to combine in a single
agency responsibility for both licensing and promotion and develop-
ment, opinions are divided. It has been argued that, on balance, the
combination is a positive virtue, that the division of these responsibili-
ties between two agencies would sacrifice the balanced judgment that
is needed and cause an overemphasis on safety in the licensing function.
A vigorous critic of the Joint Committee staff's proposal for the
creation of an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, as well as of the
AEC's internal organization and procedures, Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis of the University of Chicago Law School, views the proposal, if
adopted, as creating in the Board a driver with "a brake but no
accelerator and no steering wheel," whereas "the AEC will continue to
have all three . . . but . . . will be discouraged from using its brake."
He concludes: "If we are to give the public the best protection we
know how to provide, we won't have an extra operator with only a
brake. We will trust the one driver who can coordinate the use of all
the controls. We will trust the Commission as now organized." S'
39 Reply from Prof. Kenneth Culp Davis to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, April 19, 1961 [hereinafter cited as Davis Reply], in STAFF OF JOINT ColM.
ON AToMic ENERGY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., VIEWs AND COMnENTS ON IMPROVING
THE AEC REGULATORY PRocEss 23, 30 (Jt Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as
VIEws AND COMtENTS]. I understand Professor Davis to believe the appropriate
changes at the staff level can mitigate whatever is objectionable in the combination of
responsibilities at the Commission level. On the other hand, he sees the members
of the independent board, having "only . . . negative power," as men who will
"gradually exaggerate the safety needs and gradually underestimate the affirmative
needs for developing atomic energy." Id. at 29. He would give great weight to the
Commission's expression of fear that the "division of its functions between two agencies
• . . might well have the two agencies working at cross-purposes . . . ." Id. at 30. I
believe Professor Davis would not object to an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
that was subject to review by the Commission.
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Both the Joint Committee staff and the Berman-Hydeman studies
consider the risk of overemphasis on safety by the creation of an inde-
pendent board a lesser evil than the objections to the combination of
regulatory with promotional and development responsibilities in the
Commissioners. Indeed, as the latter study notes, one consequence of
the combination of responsibilities may even be a tendency on the part
of the Commission to bend over backward by overemphasizing safety."0
The Board proposed by the Joint Committee staff and the Berman-
Hydeman studies would, of course, have to take account of the Gov-
ernment's policy to foster the development of atomic power; the safety
issue in all licensing cases is how much risk to safety should be run
in pursuing that goal. But the Board would neither have had a
record of dealings with the applicant in regard to the particular re-
actor it was proposing nor have backed the applicant's reactor before
Congress, put up public research funds for its design, or pointed to it
with satisfaction in public addresses and press conferences. The
Board's decision could properly be defended before the public in the
reactor's neighborhood as the independent judgment of an expert and
disinterested tribunal. As is suggested by the anxiety and hostility
which have been aroused in a number of communities by the licensing
of firms for the burial of atomic wastes off their shores, nuclear power
facilities may yet have need for such a defense.4
Are Professor Davis and others justified in their fear that a
board having only safety as its responsibility would be negative in its
outlook and give too much weight to safety considerations in trying
to strike a balance? It is important to remember that in the develop-
ment of an atomic power industry, the achievement of safety is not a
fringe consideration of the sort that allows us to tolerate pollution in
streams, carcinogens in food and tobacco, and hazards on highways
40 B iAN & HnRMAN 231-33; see id. at 301; 2 JCAE STAFF STuDy 532.
41 For a report on embattled Cape Cod, see Kaln, The Government and the
People, The New Yorker, Oct. 15. 1960, p. 104. Thus, an application for a license
to dump low-level wastes in containers in the Gulf of Mexico led to intervention by
the Sportsman's Clubs of Texas, two counties, the city of Corpus Christi and the
Neuces County Navigation District. In addition, the adverse views of the Govern-
ment of Mexico were transmitted to the Commission through the State Department.
The Commission found the applicant entitled to a license for storage but remanded
the case for further testimony on the integrity of the containers for sea burial. In the
Matter of Industrial Waste Disposal Corp., 2 CCH ATom. ENERGY L. REP. ff 11462.02
(AEC June 22, 1960). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found ample
evidence to sustain the Commission's exercise of administrative discretion and upheld
the AEC. Harris County v. United States, 292 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961). Although
the public's fears may be hypochondriacal, the AEC seems to prefer to encourage land
burial rather than to arouse them further. See AEC Release No. C-12, Jan. 28, 1960.
For a series of informative articles in which a spirited style is combined with a very
conservative approach to the problems of radiation safety, see Muldoon, Alice in
Nuclear Energy Land (pts. 1-8), Mass L.Q., Dec. 1957, p. 9; March 1958, p. 38;
July 1958, p. 55; April 1959, p. 36; Oct. 1959, p. 59; April 1960, p. 37; July 1960,
p. 65; Dec. 1960, p. 109.
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and airports. The resolution of the reactor safety problem in ways
that are economically feasible is vital to the existence of the industry.
If safety costs too much, power reactors will not be built; if safety is
neglected and a single reactor incident contaminates a single com-
munity, atomic power will be at an end for years to come. The Board
would know this. The challenge to it to strike the right balance
would be imperative; error in either direction could destroy the
industry.
The AEC study refers disparagingly to the concern expressed in
the other two studies on the score of public confidence as involving
"mere considerations of public relations." ' This surely is misde-
scription. Whenever public authority is exercised in matters as to
which the public cannot be informed, the organization and procedures
for its exercise should be such as to command public confidence, since
the public has no effective check on performance. The AEC study
states, and truly, that "in the long run, it is effective performance which
is the firmest foundation for public confidence." 43 But in the interim
the people to the leeward of Peach Bottom are entitled to confidence
that for them there will be a long run.
What has been said concerning the Commission's dual responsi-
bilities assumes a degree of participation by the Commissioners in the
decisional process that is greater than actually occurs, at least in un-
contested licensing cases. The actual decisions---except on procedural
issues-are made by the AEC staff and the ACRS. Though the staff
is "separated" at the time the notice of hearing is filed in a licensing
case and may not thereafter communicate with the hearing examiner
or the Commissioners,44 by that point in time the staff's decision usually
will in fact have been reached. If separation were really to be influence-
proof, it should begin upon the filing of an application. A stickler for
disinterestedness in decisionmaking might still argue that a staff super-
vised by a Commission that appears committed to support a particular
reactor will tend toward bias in favor of that reactor; indeed, the staff
may credit the Commission with a greater commitment than it actually
possesses.
42 Report on the Regulatory Program, in 2 JCAE STAFF STUDY 415.
43 Ibid.
44 Separation of staff was instituted when the UAW intervened in the Power
Reactor Dev. Co. case. 1 JCAE STAFF STUDY 28. It extends to the Division of
Licensing and Regulation and the Division of Compliance, to counsel assigned to
those divisions, and to "'such other portions"' of the staff "'as may be required to
assist the [former] Division . . . in presentation of the staff's position at the hear-
ing."' Id. at 18. Paradoxically, the AEC Rules of Practice except cases of "initial
licensing" from the separation requirement, the very cases in which the AEC is
scrupulously insisting on separation. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.734(b) (1959). The author
has learned-unofficially-that this exception was due to inadvertent copying of
the same exception from the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 239 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1958), and will soon be corrected in a revision of the Rules.
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If this hazard is real and serious enough, the most thorough
means of doing away with it is that proposed in the Berman-Hydeman
study: creation of a separate agency in which neither Board nor staff
would have promotional responsibilities. But the positions taken by
the other studies can be defended on the ground that in both the exist-
ing structure and that proposed by the Joint Committee staff there is
an independent check on the staff's decision by a disinterested and
technically qualified body: under the present system, the ACRS; under
the proposed system, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and, on
occasion, the ACRS as well.
IV. THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
A. Who Makes Reactor Licensing Decisions in Uncontested Cases?
As this discussion has progressed, it may have grown increasingly
evident that the basic problem is the second of the two posed at the
outset of this article: how to assure, as nearly as possible, the validity
of the safety decisions reached in reactor licensing cases. Therefore,
it is necessary to inquire further into the proposition advanced above,
namely, that decisions in uncontested licensing cases are actually made
by the AEC staff in the Division of Licensing and Regulation. Before
doing that, however, some amplification and explanation of the prop-
osition are needed.
In the first place, as has been noted, staff decisions are subject to
check by the ACRS before the hearing stage is reached. By the time
notice has been given for a hearing, the staff and ACRS have reached
substantial agreement. How much disagreement may have occurred
en route is not a matter of record; the staff's initial reports to the
ACRS are not published; the ACRS "hearings" are not public; and
the ACRS reaches its conclusions in executive session. Surely the
staff would rarely recommend that a license issue to an applicant over
the objection of the ACRS, unless perhaps the disagreement went to
some minor condition. Also infrequent would be staff opposition to
a license the ACRS viewed favorably. Such opposition, if persisted in,
might precipitate a battle of experts that the Commission itself would
have to resolve.
In the second place, as was noted in discussing Peach Bottom, a
decision by the staff or the ACRS adverse to the applicant is not likely
to be challenged, especially at the construction permit stage. As was
said in a memorandum reporting a "seminar" composed largely of law-
yers experienced in reactor licensing problems:
The applicant realizing the decisive influence of the
Licensing Division's opinion and that of the ACRS on a
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hearing examiner, who is not equipped to delve into the
highly technical safety matters, prior to the hearing, will have
resolved all technical questions with the staff and the ACRS
either by convincing the staff and the ACRS of the safety
of his project or by making modifications in his design. In
the uncontested case the public hearing has not been a forum
for resolution of safety questions.4"
Third, although the decision that the Division of Licensing and
Regulation must make in a reactor licensing case takes the form of a
recommendation concerning the AEC's position in the hearing to be
held on the application, one might suppose that the Division, in arriv-
ing at its recommendation, would have to decide the ultimate question
that confronts the agency in a reactor licensing case, namely,
"whether," to quote the report based on the AEC study,4" "a specific
reactor ought to be allowed to operate in view of the policies laid down
in the act as implemented in regulations." But any such supposition
is shaken by the very next sentence in the report: "The resolution of
that question has no necessary relation to the technical skills of the
person or persons constituting the tribunal."
The AEC views the central question as being decided by "the
established system of hearing before an examiner, with review by the
Commission-and the courts, if necessary . . . . ," to quote Commis-
sioner Olson, who underlines the point by adding, "this decisional
process is to be distinguished from the technical evaluation process
performed by the Hazards Evaluation Branch and the ACRS."
4 7
This distinction between technical evaluation and policy deter-
mination will not wash. How can a body make a "technical evalua-
tion" of safety in a field where absolute safety cannot be attained and
only a "reasonable assurance" against "undue risk" is sought, without
being free to decide the policy question whether the risks fall within
tolerable limits?
The ACRS, in advising the Commission, has been unable to
avoid facing the policy question. Professor Theos J. Thompson of
M.I.T., Chairman of the ACRS, stated in the June hearings that:
[T]he ACRS as such has considered and does consider
and has discussed quite freely what we call the problem of
"the gain versus the risk."
There is no question that even a body which is com-
pletely involved and solely interested in safety must consider
45 Reply from Atomic Industrial Forum to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, April 12, 1961, in VIEws AND COMMENTS 3, 9.
46 Report on the Regulatory Program, in 2 JCAE STAFF STUDY 415.
47Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 300 (testimony of Commissioner
Olson).
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this problem to some extent. There is no way of completely
divorcing promotion from safety since, if you want absolute
safety, you must not build any reactors whatsoever.
If you make the policy decision to build reactors, then
you have incorporated a certain amount of risk and you have
incorporated certain gains. This policy decision is up to
the AEC.48
The letter from Acting Director of the Division of Licensing and
Regulation Robert Lowenstein, advising Philadelphia Electric that the
Division did not have sufficient information to warrant issuance of a
construction permit for Peach Bottom,4 9 inevitably implied that the
Division had reached a policy judgment under the loose standard
governing the issuance of provisional permits approved in the Power
Reactor Dev. Co. case.50
If it is impossible to make a technical evaluation of reactor safety
without making a policy decision, is it nonetheless possible to make a
policy decision on reactor safety without an understanding of the
technical evaluation? It is, of course, possible for any tribunal to
decide a question that it does not fully understand; courts have to do
this frequently. But the task of the courts which find themselves in
that predicament is dispute settlement. Regardless of whether they
have a satisfactory grasp of what is at issue, they must proceed to a
48Id. at 387 (remarks of Prof. T. J. Thompson). Customarily, the ACRS
conclusions, when favorable to the applicant, are couched in terms paralleling the
AEC's regulations. See, e.g., the ACRS letter in Consumers Power Co., Big Rock
Point, Mich., March 14, 1960, in AEC Release No. C-52, March 25, 1960. For a
striking example of an ACRS policy decision, see the ACRS letter of June 30, 1960,
on the small-size pressurized water reactor, proposed to be built by the AEC at a
site near Jamestown, N.Y. The ACRS wrote in part:
The Committee can find no serious technical fault with the reactor, the
containment, and the safety features proposed, insofar as the partial infor-
mation supplied to date has presented the case. The Committee emphasizes,
however, that power reactors are relatively new and untried, and that there
exists a considerable degree of uncertainty in our knowledge of their long-
term safe behavior. Accordingly, the Committee doubts that the new and
relatively untried technical features for improved safety proposed by the
applicant, since our last report, are a satisfactory substitute for the inherent
safety implied by a greater distance from population centers.
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards strongly urges that,
as a matter of policy, the Atomic Energy Commission not build this reactor
at this site since the reactor cannot safely demonstrate economic nuclear
power or anything else here that it could not do more satisfactorily at a
better site.
49 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
50 In the Matter of Power Reactor Dev. Co., 2 CCH ATom. ENERGY L. REP.
111201.15, at 17225-47 (AEC May 26, 1959), rev'd sub. norm. International Union
of Elec. Workers v. United States, 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd sub. nor.
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396
(1961).
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decision between the contestants, using as best they can such aids as
the rules governing burden of proof.
In the normal reactor licensing case, the hearing examiner is not
trying to resolve a dispute. In every case save one, the parties before
him have been in agreement that the permit or license should issue.
He is not ordinarily confronted by two conflicting lines of fact testi-
mony and expert opinion between which he must make as good a
choice as he can. The fact that there was a potential conflict-"the
interest of the applicant versus the interest of the public," as Commis-
sioner Olson put it 51-does not cast the examiner in the judge's role,
since the conflict has been resolved before the hearing began.
Is the examiner able to say that the shared conclusion of the
applicant, the staff, and the ACRS is wrong-or even that it is right?
All he knows about the matter is the simplified version presented at
the hearing, a version which counsel for the applicant and counsel for
the staff have carefully supervised, with a view to the proposed findings
that they will submit to the examiner when the hearing is over. Coun-
sel for the staff will frequently try to bring out the significance of the
safety issues in the case by his examination or cross-examination of
witnesses, and the examiner may ask some questions to advance his
comprehension of the case. But this is shadow boxing; unless counsel
have botched the job, there will be no basis for the examiner to do
other than to accept the decision the staff has reached, unless he can
introduce some new rules of the game.
This view of the examiner's limitations has not been accepted by
the Commission. In the hearings last spring, Commissioner Olson
responded as follows when he was asked by J. T. Ramey, executive
director of the Joint Committee staff, whether the examiner was to
"go into substance':
Mr. Ramey, the hearing examiner is supposed to make
a decision based upon the record on the ultimate question of
safety. He is not to contribute evidence from his own mind
to that record. He is to take the evidence of the record and
to try to conclude whether all evidence available, whatever it
be, fact and opinion, is expressed on the record. He then pro-
ceeds to try to evaluate the record and to try to evaluate this
question of risk as identified on the record, to ascertain
whether that record supports a conclusion, a policy and tech-
nical judgment on the ultimate question of reasonable assur-
ance of safety. I think that he has a broader function than
just to be a notary taking a deposition.5"
51Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 374 (remarks of Commissioner
Olson).
52Id. at 313.
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There are, to be sure, opportunities aplenty for the examiner to
make rulings that do not go to the merits. He can refuse to order
that an applicant be issued an operating license until, at a new hearing,
inspectors testify that the reactor has in fact been built as represented
in the application.53 He can refuse to order an operating license on the
ground that, after the case was noticed for hearing, the applicant sub-
mitted a minor technical amendment to his application.54 Or, more
consequentially, he can limit an operating license to permit operation
only up to a specified low power level and postpone a license for a
higher level until a new hearing has been held to receive testimony as
to the reactor's behavior at the lower level.55 The exercise of authority
to prescribe ground rules of this nature does not require an under-
standing of the technical evidence; on the contrary, burdensome rules
of the sort noted seem designed as safeguards against a lack of under-
standing.
It has been urged that a hearing before an examiner has various
values: that it provides an orderly public record of the grounds on
which the staff approved the reactor, that it puts pressure on the ap-
plicant and the staff to do their homework, and that it provides an
opportunity for intervention by public or public-spirited bodies.5
These considerations-which are most persuasive with respect to the
hearing on a construction permit-will be considered later in this
article. But it should be stated here that they do not in any way
conflict with the proposition that the examiner who lacks an under-
standing of technical safety issues cannot rationally review the merits
of a decision on these issues that has already been reached by the staff.
Is the Commission itself any better able to review the merits of
the staff's decision in an uncontested case after the examiner has found
for the applicant? How able is the Commission to apply policy con-
siderations without having made its own technical evaluation or having
fully understood that of its staff ? In one respect, of course, the Com-
mission is in a position superior to the examiner's, for the Commis-
sion will usually include two or more technically qualified members
and, if technical question marks are sufficiently conspicuous in the
record, these members may spot them and push behind the record.
Note that, if they were to do so, they would be deviating from the
3The Commission so ruled, sua sponte, in In the Matter of Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 2 CCH ATom. ENERGY L. Ray. [ 11223, at 17263-3 (AEC May 6, 1959). See
generally 1 JCAE STAFF STUDY 31-33; BERMAN & HYDEMAN 125-26.54 See In the Matter of Yankee Atomic Elec. Co., 2 CCH AToM. ENERGY L. REP.
11232, at 17309 (AEC Sept 26, 1959).
55 See In the Matter of Commonwealth Edison Co., 2 CCH AToM. ENERGY L.
REP. 11229, at 17276 (AEC Sept. 26, 1956). This procedure now is embodied in
an AEC regulation. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.57 (Supp. 1961).
Be See 1 JCAE STAFF STuDY 49, quoted with approval by Commissioner L. K.
Olson in Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 304-05.
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position the Commissioners appear to have adopted for their informal
review of their own hearing examiners' decisions, namely, of viewing
the process as analogous to a review of the decision of a lower court,
inquiring whether there is sufficient evidence of record to sustain the
examiner's findings." Such use of standards developed for appellate
review of judicial or administrative action is perhaps understandable,
given the limited time available and the Commission's concern to assure
a decision supported by evidence of record, but it is not likely to yield
an effective evaluation of the staff's decision. Only rarely will counsel
for applicant and staff have failed to provide ample evidence to support
the proposed findings they will have submitted to the examiner.U
The chance that one of the Commissioner-experts will break
through the fagade of findings in an uncontested case is small. They
are obliged to proceed, usually without argument, on the basis of a
necessarily over-simplified record supported by a brief and often
enigmatic letter from the ACRS, in such time as they can steal from
the many wholly unrelated concerns that press upon time-from test
bans to Canadian uranium contracts. Naturally, in such a situation
they "usually ask for a briefing of the decision," " which is furnished
by a special assistant from the General Counsel's office.
From the time the hearing has been noticed, moreover, the Com-
mission will have cut itself off from any contact with the Hazards
557Commissioner Graham sees the hearing examiner as analogous to a federal
district judge. See Hearings on Development, Growth, and State of Atomic Energy
Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 98, 99 (1960) ;
Hearings on Indemnity and Reactor Safety Before the Subcommittee on Research
and Development of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
234 (1960). The Commission's concern that the record contain sufficient evidence to
sustain the examiner's findings and conclusions is manifest in Commissioner Graham's
testimony in Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulations at 309. At that hearing
the author questioned the aptness of the Commission's "appellate court review." Id.
at 375. No doubt the Commission would not pursue the judicial analogy as far as
to accept evidence as "sufficient!' simply because the findings it supported were not
clearly erroneous. I should infer that, in their informal appellate review, the Com-
missioners would seek to gauge whether the evidence in support of the examiner's
findings was substantial.
58 In the only uncontested facility licensing case remanded for deficiencies in the
record, the lack of evidence on the point at issue was total; the Commission required
that matters which had been left to inspection be covered by testimony of record.
In the Matter of Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 2 CCH AToM. ENERGY L. Rsa'. 1 11223, at
17263-3 (AEC May 6, 1959). In a hotly contested waste disposal case, the Com-
mission remanded because, although it said the "record supports the findings of the
Hearing Examiner with respect to [the other points in issue] . . . . ," the Com-
mission found "insufficient evidence to establish the integrity of the proposed con-
tainers after disposal at sea . . . ." In the Matter of Industrial Waste Disposal
Corp., 2 CCH ATom. ENERGY L. REP. f 11462, at 17622 (AEC June 22, 1960), af'd
sub nom. Harris County v. United States, 292 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1961). On this
point, the failure again seems to have been total, since the record did "not disclose
any comprehensive testimony concerning the effect of sea pressure." Id. at 17629.
59 Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 312 (testimony of Commissioner
Olson). Commissioner Olson prefaced these remarks by stating that each Commissioner
takes a good deal of interest in looking over examiners' decisions in uncontested cases
from every point of view, procedural and substantive, before they become final. Ibid.
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Evaluation Branch and so will have deprived itself of such illumination
as might be provided by discussion with the experts who often will
have been worrying over the application for months. Moreover, per-
haps for lack of time and occasion, the Commission will not have con-
sulted with other experts in the AEC who are not engaged in regu-
latory work, though its rules would allow them (but not the examiner)
this privilege.' Finally, those Commissioners who are not recent ap-
pointees may find it hard to escape recalling the considerations that led
them earlier to approve contracting with, providing research funds
for, and seeking congressional approval of, the applicant on behalf
of this very reactor.
Now and then, procedural questions may be caught, perhaps by
the special assistant, which will lead the Commission to depart from
the terms of the order as it left the examiner's hands, 1 but, with all
respect for the Commissioners' conscientious conception of their duties,
it seems clear that, on substantive matters of safety in uncontested
cases, the process of review on the record can scarcely escape from be-
ing a rubber-stamp operation in all respects save the time it consumes.
In the rare case that is contested, either by an intervenor or by the staff
appearing in opposition to the application, the examiner will have to
make a decision. If the issue goes to difficult technical matters, there
is no reason to presume that the decision will be valid, however faith-
fully the examiner applies himself to the (probably) immense record.
Much time will have been lost to provide a record for review by the
Commission. If the Commission perseveres in what it terms its quasi-
judicial procedure, it will find it difficult to set aside the examiner's
order since his findings will probably be supported by evidence of
record. But it is hard to suppose that the technically qualified Com-
missioners would be content to be bound by that rule if they were
left uneasy by the situation revealed in the record. They would find
that their lawyer brethren have handicapped them by a clumsy pro-
cedure-a remand for additional hearings being the indicated route.
Perhaps impatience with formalized procedures and the grim specter
of mounting costs would lead the Commission to take advantage of the
leeway for "initial licensing" allowed by the Administrative Procedure
Act and try to get at the heart of the problem by talking to the people
who know most about it, unseparating the staff in the process.
B. Is a Review of Uncontested Staff Decisions Needed?
One who deplored the time spent by the applicant, the AEC staff,
and the Commission in carrying through the routine of hearings and
60 10 C.F.R. § 2.734(b) (1959). Compare note 44 supra.
81 See note 53 sufPra and accompanying text.
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review now followed in uncontested cases (not once but ordinarily
several times for each reactor) might well disagree with the Joint
Committee staff and the Berman-Hydeman studies that a review of the
decision reached by the AEC staff and the ACRS is needed in un-
contested cases. Why not treat power and test reactors as research
reactors are now treated: if the ACRS concurs, let the staff decide
the matter, making public its hazards analysis together with the ap-
plication, and allow any interested person or body to compel a hearing
by challenging the staff's order?
This poses what I have thought to be the key question in the
AEC's facility licensing problem: Absent a contest, is there a need for
review on the merits of the safety issue decided by the AEC staff and
concurred in by the ACRS ?
On one aspect of this question, an assured answer is possible: the
fact that there is no contest does not mean that there are no substantive
questions meriting review. Whatever provision for public notice may
be made-and until recently it has been inadequate-there are many
impediments to effective intervention. An obvious one is cost. Even
if the intervenor is not planning to take his objections to the courts in
case he fails before the Commission, very substantial expense is in-
volved in employing counsel and experts needed to analyze carefully
the mound of documents thrown up in the prehearing process, to ex-
plore questions with the AEC staff and the applicant, and to prepare
testimony in support of intervention if agreement is not reached. Few
public or private bodies are prepared to spend funds of that order of
magnitude, especially when they cannot be sure at the start that the
staff and ACRS will not prove entirely correct. Hence we must as-
sume that interventions will be few. Moreover, the ability to enlist
scientific consultants at the level of expertise necessary is not open to
all intervenors, regardless of their ability to pay. And we have already
noted in discussing Peach Bottom the deterrents to contest by the
applicant, given the kind of review which the present process provides.
Even if one grants that the problems resolved by the staff and the
ACRS in an uncontested case may be just as hard and just as serious
as those raised by an intervenor in a contested case, is there any justi-
fication for further technical review after the careful study that the
matter has already received? This is a question that can be consid-
ered both "on principle" and in relation to the respective situations of
the two bodies who now make the decisions-the AEC staff and the
ACRS.
On principle, there would seem to be a need for a second look at
any decision involving the safety of thousands which has been made
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by staff members whose work of necessity has immersed them in the
details of the case and brought them in close and frequent contact with
the persons whose application is at issue. A detached reviewing body,
if technically qualified, is more likely to see the particular facets of a
problem in context and perspective; it will not have associated with
the applicant's personnel; it will not have had to take tough positions
on certain questions-the need for further costly tests, for example-
and so to have developed a "reasonable" attitude on other questions.
Moreover, scrutiny by the staff is likely to be more searching if the
adequacy of its analysis and its findings must pass muster before an-
other knowledgeable body. At this point, however, is not the need
for review met by the ACRS? Doesn't the work of that committee
render review by another body redundant?
Clearly the ACRS has been discharging the functions of a review-
ing body. But has it been able to do so well enough that no further
check is called for; more important perhaps, can it continue to perform
its functions as effectively as it has been able to do thus far?
The ACRS is highly regarded. Comments on its work are replete
with compliments. On the other hand, the ACRS's workload has been
mounting. It has had to rely increasingly on its subcommittees which
meet with staff and applicants between sessions of the full committee.
The ACRS itself meets at intervals of one or two months and, in a
three-day session, "typically reviews 6 to 10 or more projects and com-
pletes reports on such projects to the Commission as required by stat-
ute." 62 It is difficult to see how this pace can be stepped up.
An overload would mean less time per case and a spottier selection
of questions for detailed consideration. Moreover, though the ACRS
is formally a body advisory to the Commission, its close contact with
the work of the Hazards Evaluation Branch has led to some of the sort
of redundancy that imposes burdens on applicants and could undermine
staff morale.63
Concern with such considerations, heightened by the fact that the
AEC's promotional and developmental efforts may result in still heavier
workloads in the future, has led to substantial agreement on the de-
sirability of reducing the ACRS's responsibilities. 4 Although a dimi-
62 Reply From Atomic Industrial Forum to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, April 12, 1961, in VIEws AND COMMENTS 7. "To perform their difficult task
in the limited time available, the ACRS has developed a basically standard form of
brief report which varies from case to case only in the degree of enigma built into
each letter. The reports usually are not helpful to an understanding of the project
because the bases for the committee's conclusions are not set forth." Ibid.
63 For an extended analysis of the difficult role into which the ACRS is now cast,
see BmAN & HYDEmAx 107-21.
64ACRS Chairman Silverman himself suggested that "as time goes on, the staff
should gradually assume the responsibility for review of all reactors except new and
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nution in the role of the ACRS as the regular reviewer of staff action
would, of course, cut back the protection which that committee now
affords, the reduction would not be proportional, for the ACRS would
still be available for novel, serious safety questions. Some less obvious
problems, however, might slip past the staff, and the staff might also
prove less ready to call on the ACRS for advice and support than
would be desirable. If the nominal review now provided by the hear-
ing before the examiner and the Commission's look at the record were
to continue, dependence on the staff would thus become very great.
Probably the present staff would rise to the responsibility which
the shortcomings of the reviewing process would impose upon it, but
this response might not persist. Opinion seems general that the
Hazards Evaluation Branch staff has been growing stronger, and this
trend may continue. But if the demand for atomic power reactors
should increase, this staff might find itself raided by industry and
forced to begin the building-up process anew just as its workload
expanded.
The Joint Committee staff and Messrs. Berman and Hydeman
were persuaded that review of the merits of safety issues was needed
above the staff level and that this called for a reviewing body that
included technically qualified members, 5 a specification that even the
Commission has sometimes been barely able to meet.66 The Joint
Committee staff did not explore the possibility that the Commission
itself might perform that function, partly because of the Commission's
unique types, and the Committee should confine its duties more and more to safety
policy matters and to unique nuclear safety problems." 2 JCAE STAFF STUDY 591.
The AEC study suggests that, "with the increased maturity of the hazards evaluation
staff, the Committee should more and more concern itself with broad principles of
safety rather than with a comprehensive review of the specific problems of individual
reactors, thus making use of the time and energy of Committee members at a level
more commensurate with their high degree of skill." Report on the Regulatory
Program, in id. at 406. The Joint Committee staff study would have references to
the ACRS made "on a selective basis." 1 JCAE STAFF STUDY 49, 71. The Berman-
Hydeman study would either have the review function of the ACRS merged with the
hearing or, after an interim period of two or three years, relieve the ACRS of case-
by-case analysis. BERMA" & HYDEmAN 326.
65 "Two members of the Board should be specially qualified by training and
experience in fields of science or engineering relevant to safety. For the third posi-
tion . .. a person knowledgeable in the conduct of administrative proceedings [is
need . ... The staff notes that although "no fulltime reviewing body can be
expected to embrace all the branches of pure and applied science that may be relevant
... ,sound scientific training and experience in one field can enable its possessor
to appreciate the problems of another field and equip him to evaluate evidence . .. ."
The reviewer, the staff member, and the scientific witness "'speak the same language."'
1 JCAE STAFF STUDY 69, 74-75. A board composed of "a scientist, an engineer, and
a lawyer" is suggested in BERmAN & HYDEMAN 319.
6 6 Thus, from the resignation of Commissioner J. H. Williams in June 1960 until
the appointment in the winter of 1961 of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg and Dr. Leland
Haworth, the only member with scientific training was Commissioner Robert E.
Wilson, a chemical engineer who from 1945 to 1958 was board chairman of Standard
Oil of Indiana.
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conflicting functions, partly because of the Commission's lack of time.
A review process enabling the Commission to reach an independent
judgment as to the safety of every proposed power and test reactor at
the construction permit stage or of every constructed reactor at the
operating license stage (or stages) would, for reasons developed later
in this article, mean much more work than its present practice of
taking an informal, unofficial look at the cases before the examiner's
intermediate orders become final. Moreover, as the Joint Committee
staff warned, "contested proceedings to suspend or revoke materials
and waste disposal licenses, alone, could dangerously overburden the
Commission as a regulatory body." 17 It is simply unrealistic to
expect the directorate of a multibillion dollar enterprise with responsi-
bility for many grave governmental policies to take time out of their
busy weeks to sit as an examining board in complex and possibly pro-
tracted licensing cases, whatever the technical aid that might be af-
forded them.
The Berman-Hydeman study examined in some detail the possi-
bility of greater participation by the Commissioners in the regulatory
process 6 --for example, by presiding over hearings in major licensing
actions and by writing opinions in such cases. However, the authors
note that "the Commissioners already are overburdened with responsi-
bilities" and that, as "a practical matter, . . they may not be able
to perform this additional and essential function effectively." " Al-
though they advance various suggestions for reducing the burden that
more active participation in regulatory actions would cast upon the
Commissioners, they end up by recommending a separate regulatory
agency.
The Board concept, as developed in the Joint Committee staff and
Berman-tydeman studies, has two important advantages over the
Commission as a reviewing body, apart from the fact that the Board
would not have sponsored the reactors for which licenses are sought.
671 JCAE STAFF STUDY 66. A recent summary, AEC's Regulatory Program,
in 2 JCAE STAFF STUDY 98-100, lists 525 outstanding operators' licenses for individuals
to manipulate reactor controls, 5,798 licenses for domestic possession, use, and transfer
of nuclear byproducts, 1,149 licenses for the domestic possession, use, and transfer of
nuclear source materials, and 340 licenses for specific uses of nuclear materials. By
contrast, there are only twelve power and test reactor construction permits and
operating licenses outstanding and 76 permits for research reactors and critical experi-
ment facilities. As the number of these licenses grows, and with it the AEC's com-
pliance and inspection machinery, the number of license suspension and revocation
cases is sure to increase, unless the states assume a greater load under § 274 of the act,
added by 73 Stat. 688 (1959), 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (Supp. II, 1961), than now seems likely.
Only partial protection can be afforded the Commission by its recent action making
review of the examiner's intermediate decisions a matter of discretion. See 10 C.F.R.
§ 2.752 (Supp. 1961) (effective April 15, 1961). A board could handle this business
more readily.
6 BEmix & HYDEmAx 286-93.
69 Id. at 289.
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The first of these advantages is that a majority of its members would
always be technically qualified. The second advantage is that these
members would have time to examine carefully the safety problems
coming before them. Of course the Board's review should not be com-
prehensive; it ought not to inquire into all the matters that the Hazards
Evaluation Branch has covered, unless the reactor is so novel that
only such coverage will permit a sound judgment to be reached; but
it should seek to identify the problems that were troublesome below
and probe as deeply into those problems as their difficulty and the
hazards involved would warrant. As Dr. Thompson's statement has
made plain,7" the Board could not escape weighing the gains against
the risks but, unlike the hearing examiner and the Commission today,
the Board members would know, as nearly as the nature of the ques-
tions made possible, what the risks really were.
This does not mean that the Board would always view the risks
as larger than the Commission would see them. The contrary might
be true. Being free from the need to attest its own objectivity and
being adequately informed on the physical problems presented, the
Board might well decide on occasion that the staff had been overcon-
servative. Moreover, applicants, able to address their arguments to
knowing decisionmakers from whose decision no time-consuming ad-
ministrative appeal could be taken, might be emboldened now and then
to dispute the staff's conclusions and carry their cases to the Board.
C. What Procedure Should Be Employed in Reactor Licensing?
In descending order of satisfaction, the AEC, the Joint Commit-
tee staff, and the Berman-Hydeman studies all accepted the idea that
at least one public hearing should be mandatory in a reactor licensing
case, preferably at the construction permit stage. All three contem-
plated a hearing at which oral testimony would be presented by wit-
nesses, though the Joint Committee staff study stressed the importance
of "informal methods of conducting the hearing," including "'round-
table' exchanges.'" "The oral testimony," it added, "would be by way
of testing and explaining the views of the experts." 71
Professor Davis has objected strenuously to "trial-type hearings"
in uncontested cases. He and Commissioner L. K. Olson and AEC
General Counsel N. D. Naidin have engaged in a spirited exchange of
views on the subject of whether in such cases trial-type hearings are pre-
scribed by the hearing requirements in the 1957 amendments to the
70 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
711 JCAE STAFF STuDY 72.
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Atomic Energy Act.7' That is a question which I shall not consider
since, no matter which view is to prevail, the problem of which answer
would be the better for the future will remain. Turning to that problem,
I believe it will be helpful to consider what criteria should be satisfied
by a review procedure for uncontested reactor licensing cases, the usual
cases in which the AEC staff, the ACRS, and the applicant are in
agreement. Of these, the following desiderata seem to me the most
important.
(1) The procedure should inform the general public as fully as
is reasonably practicable concerning considerations underlying the
staff's recommendations. Criticism of the AEC's failure to provide
such information in the Power Reactor Dev. Co. case was one of the
factors leading to the 1957 amendments. Recognition of the inef-
fectiveness of trial-type hearings held in Washington for this purpose
led the AEC to institute experimentally last summer a press-conference
type of proceeding in the vicinity of each reactor, 3 a move independently
urged by Professor Davis, who also sees it as satisfying, in the absence
of a contest, the statutory requirement of a hearing, despite the fact
that the presentations are not addressed to any decisionmaker.74
In my opinion, the press-conference type of proceeding would be
satisfactory for its limited purpose if representatives of the applicant
were the only ones to undertake explaining and defending the safety
merits of the installation, and the AEC representatives were simply to
preside and explain the procedure still to be followed by the AEC in
passing upon the license application.7" If, as I believe to be the present
72 Professor Davis' views were first presented in his letter to the Committee,
see Davis Reply, in VIEws AND COMMENTS 25-27, were repeated in the panel dis-
cussion in Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 372-74, 376, were published
in an article, Dueprocessitis it the Atomic Energy Commission, 47 A.B.A.J. 782
(1961), and were restated with special reference to the issue of statutory interpre-
tation in the correspondence appearing (with his A.B.AJ. article) in Hearings on
Radiation Safety and Regulation app. 6, at 420-27. Underlying these presentations
of his views is 1 DAvis, ADMINIsTRAivE LAw TREATISE §§ 7.01-10, 7.20 (1958). For
the AEC viewpoint, see AEC Memorandum Concerning Mandatory Hearing Require-
ment under Atomic Energy Act, in Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation
382-85. One of the main points at issue was whether the statute requires trial-type
hearings.
7
3 The AEC's intention to initiate this plan at the Vallecitos Reactor in Pleasan-
ton, Cal., was announced, with credit to Professor Davis, by Commissioner Olson,
see Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 299. Professor Davis' proposal,
as it appeared in Davis Reply, in VIEWs AND COMMENTS 25, was modified in his
A.B.A.J. article, by the elimination of the impractical requirement that the public be
informed by a "full and detailed" report by the ACRS "giving a full statement of
pros and cons with respect to each facet of safety." Davis, Dueprocessitis in the
Atomic Energy Commission, 47 A.B.AJ. 782, 784 (1961).
74 See id. at 784 n.12.
75 Since I believed the AEC was not planning to limit its representatives' role
in the manner I have proposed, I questioned at the Joint Committee hearings the
wisdom of the AEC plan announced by Commissioner Olson. See Hearings on Radi-
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practice, the ARC representatives address themselves to the safety
merits of the reactor, they put the AEC in the position of defending the
reactor's safety to the general public before a decision has been reached
that it is safe enough to be licensed. Whatever their disclaimers, they
add another degree of commitment to the Commission's already com-
promised objectivity. Obviously this procedure will cause no trouble
until the AEC encounters troublemakers in a case in which the pro-
posed reactor is viewed with doubt or hostility by vigilant citizens
groups, skeptical scientists, worried PTA spokesmen, and local poli-
ticians eager for a new issue. The more canny the AEC representatives
are, the more doubt they will sow in the minds of the audience; the
more emphatic they are in the reactor's defense, the greater the Com-
mission's commitment will be in the public's mind. If the Commission
should later fail to uphold its staff, that will be viewed as a victory for
the militant protectors of the local interest and an inspiration to the
next community in which a reactor is planned.
(2) The procedure should provide an occasion for which the ap-
plicant and staff must prepare in advance a cogent, technically compe-
tent summary of their respective positions, and at which they must
defend these positions publicly before their peers. The main value of
this is in calling forth the best efforts of the participants, in confronting
them with the need to check back over their data, their theories, and the
reasoning that supports their case. The material on which such
presentations are based should be available long enough in advance of
the proceeding to alert potential intervenors and enable scientists re-
tained by them to prepare for attending and perhaps taking part in the
proceedings. Obviously, the less competent the persons to whom the
presentations are made to understand them fully, the less effective will
the occasion be as a stimulus to first-rate work by the applicant and
AEC staff.
(3) The procedure should provide an opportunity for the decision-
maker, whether an individual or a board, to explore publicly such of
the considerations underlying the staff's conclusions as might give rise
to doubt, to test by searching questions any assumptions that might
seem shaky, and any conclusions that might appear dubious. The par-
ticipants in the proceeding may assist in this process by their own ques-
tioning of the experts but, since, by hypothesis, absent intervention, they
are in basic agreement, the questions most likely to illumine shadowy
points would probably come from the decisionmaker. In any event,
ation Safety and Regulation 380. Commissioner Olson remarked that he "never took
much stock in trying to solve a problem by keeping people in the dark." Id. at 388.
Though I share that view, I think the main questions are who should shed the light
and when.
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the procedure should disclose publicly not only the considerations con-
trolling the decision on all safety questions that merit review but also
something of the quality of the decisionmaking process: Is it such as
to command the confidence of those who are able to evaluate the intel-
lectual disciplines and processes involved?
(4) The importance of conducting the inquiries outlined above in
public should not compel the sealing off of the decisionmaker from all
communications not made in the public proceeding. Detachment of the
reviewer from the operations that must later be reviewed would be
desirable, as would be standards of conduct to prevent the circumven-
tion of the public proceedings by behind-the-scenes decisionmaking.
But, especially in uncontested cases, this should not require strait-
jacketing precautions of the sort that have been found necessary in
regulatory fields in which rival interests do battle for huge stakes.
(5) The procedure should not prescribe public proceedings of the
sort indicated above as essential at every stage in a long and complex
process such as is involved in power and test reactor licensing. Efforts
should be made to avoid repetitive proceedings on questions of minor
consequence which will arise from time to time. Provision should be
made to screen these questions from others of more serious import;
indeed, this screening process itself is an important responsibility.
(6) Finally, the procedure should provide for a means of con-
verting the uncontested case into a contested one if the process of
probing the problem or the decision on the application itself should give
rise to controversy. The procedure indicated for the contested case
should turn not only on the nature of the issues but on the interests and
temper of the contestants and the extent to which they may contem-
plate seeking a review in the courts. Hopefully some contests could
be conducted with no more procedural formality than would be neces-
sary in an uncontested case, but, of course, this would have to depend
on cooperation, not prescription.
It has been argued earlier in this article that the hearing examiner
is not qualified to review the concurring conclusions of the AEC Haz-
ards Evaluation Branch, the ACRS, and the applicant on technical
matters. If this proposition is accepted, then no procedure could be
designed by which a proceeding over which the examiner alone pre-
sided could satisfy the second and third of the criteria listed, the two
that are crucial to effective review. From the standpoint both of stimu-
lating first-rate performance by those who conduct the initial studies
and of assuring a searching evaluation of their conclusions, the pro-
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ceeding must be held before decisionmakers who include technically
qualified people, men who can be viewed as peers of the experts who
come before them.
This is a standard the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board could
meet. So, ordinarily, could the Commission. Could procedural changes
enable the Commission to discharge the review function which the
Joint Committee staff study assigned to the Board?
Professor Davis, who chides the Commission for succumbing to
"dueprocessitis," a paralyzing malady induced by an overdose of due
process in its legal advice,76 would have uncontested cases sent "to the
five Commissioners, not to a hearing examiner." There would be "no
trial, no examiner, and no separation of functions." 71
The Commissioners, if afflicted by individual or collective doubts,
would be free to consult with the AEC staff, the members of the ACRS,
and the applicant's technical representatives. Professor Davis believes
that "dispensing with trial procedure in uncontested cases" and free-
dom to consult would "to some extent reduce the burden on the five
Commissioners." 78 If, in a given case, they reached a conclusion de-
parting from that in which the staff, the ACRS, and the applicant were
united, the applicant could convert the case into a contested case and
seek a trial-type hearing or an argument, or both, depending on the
nature of the disagreement.
Professor Davis has found it unnecessary to prescribe any pro-
cedure for the five Commissioners to follow, once the case has been
sent to them, and therefore, in attempting to gauge the impact of his
proposal on their burden, I must indulge in conjecture. To begin
with, I note the difference between the direct routing he proposes and
the way the uncontested case reaches the Commission today, preceded
by the full panoply of a formal "trial-type" hearing, the examiner's
findings, intermediate decision, and order which will become final after
forty-five days, assuming, ex hypothesi, no exceptions to it have been
filed within twenty days. However burdensome to the staff and appli-
cant, this facilitates the informal, appellate-court type of review which
I believe the Commissioners now give.
With this apparatus eliminated, I suppose the staff would at least
draft a proposed order prescribing the terms of the construction permit
76 For a more complete etiology, see Davis, Dueprocessitis in the Atomic Energy
Commission, 47 A.B.A.J. 782 (1961).
77 Davis Reply, in ViEws AND COMMENTS 24-27; see Davis, Dueprocessitis in the
Atomic Energy Commission, 47 A.B.A.J. 782, 784 (1961).
78 Davis Reply, in VIEws AND COMMENTS 28. The range of consultation con-
templated by Professor Davis in this statement, id. at 24, extends beyond consultation
with the AEC technical staff, the only consultation he mentioned in Dueprocessitis in
the Atomic Energy Commission, 47 A.B.A.J. 782 (1961).
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(or operating license) and probably would show it to the applicant so
that any objections could be ironed out in advance. The documentation
provided the Commissioners by the staff would doubtless include that
presented to the press-conference-type hearing, though, of course, the
massive material filed by the applicant in the proceeding would also
be available. Maybe this would be as good for the purpose of a quick
formal initial decision by the Commission as the record it now receives
is for a quick informal Commission review. However, recalling
that at the press conference the good folk of the vicinage had been as-
sured that the decision would be made by the Commissioners them-
selves, I should think they would be rather more hesitant to make a
quick formal initial decision than they would be to make a quick in-
formal review decision. If so, no doubt they would ask for guidance,
calling in technical people, if need be, from all the sources Professor
Davis has suggested should be available to them.
Whatever one may think of this mode of decisionmaking because
of its behind-the-scenes character, it seems likely that the Commis-
sioners who pursued these consultations could learn more about the
safety issues in the case than they are likely to in their present review
procedure. But that this educative process would not "reduce the bur-
den on the five Commissioners" seems to me self-evident.
A scheme of decisionmaking which would require the Commis-
sion to make the initial decision on the issue of safety in all uncontested
cases would confront the Commissioners with a dilemma. Either they
could keep their regulatory workload down to its present dimensions
by devoting no more time to their decisionmaking than they do at
present, or, instead, they could devote whatever time and attention they
needed to achieve a real understanding of the questions faced by the
ACRS and the staff and arrive, as a body, at answers based on that
understanding.
As I see it, if the Commission devoted to its initial decisionmaking
only the time it now gives to review, it could exercise a kind of con-
tinuing supervisory authority over the work of the Division of Licens-
ing and Regulation, once in a while moving into a case that struck the
Commissioners as worrisome. This procedure would, in my opinion,
be justifiable as a substitute for a careful case-by-case review of power
and test reactor license applications only on the assumption that no
review was really needed in the absence of a contest, a view I do not
accept.
The latter horn of the dilemma presents different and perhaps
more serious difficulties. The increased burden on the Commissioners
could be carried only at the expense of their other important duties. I
[Voi.110:330
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should expect the task of reviewing the recommendations of the hazards
evaluation staff would gradually be taken over by a technical staff at
the Commission level, and the Commissioners would find themselves
providing a facade behind which their technical and legal advisers
would reach the decisions the Commissioners would sign. This has
happened before in Washington.
In either event, the review would not provide the benefits of a
public proceeding. To provide those, a body such as the proposed
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board seems necessary. But should the
Board hold a hearing of the sort now held before the examiner? Pro-
fessor Davis sees need for a trial-type hearing only on contested issues
of fact and sometimes on "issues which are only somewhat factual";
on contested "non-factual issues of policy or discretion" he would use
"argument procedure that resembles the procedure before an appellate
court," unless the latter issues are "mixed up with issues of fact" that
are contested.7' But here, at the start at least, there are no contested
issues whatever, and so, happily, I am relieved from any temptation to
play Procrustes in order to fit the proceeding which I think is indicated
into either of the twin beds that Professor Davis has made for classi-
fying hearings that decide contests.
The licensing review proceeding constitutes an examination into
a complex set of facts-including theories and expert opinions-in
order to appraise the conclusions reached by the AEC staff which has
conducted the basic investigation and by the AEC's adviser, the
ACRS. This review is not designed to resolve disputes but to check
judgments-judgments on interrelated scientific, technological, and
policy questions. Yet in the process of checking these judgments, the
examining board may, through its process of study and questioning,
find itself growing doubtful of the factual foundations of the conclusions
reached by the staff at certain points, and it may call for more evidence,
possibly for new research and experimentation. Its role should not
be conceived as that of an umpire in an adversary process. Rather, its
role should be much more affirmative, and its procedure more flexible
and less formal.
Perhaps the best analogue to the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board that I have envisaged is none other than the ACRS as it now
operates. The main differences between the proposed Board's review
as I see it and the ACRS review as it is now conducted are these:
First, the Board's review proceedings would be public. Second, the
Board's review would tend to be somewhat more comprehensive and
less of a spot check, though certainly the Board should not reexamine
79 See Davis Reply, in VIEws AND COMMENTS 27, 31.
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every point covered in the staff's investigation. Third, the Board
would ordinarily conduct more extended inquisitions into the findings
and thinking of the applicant and AEC staff, though, if due account is
taken of the work of ACRS subcommittees, this might not be the case.
Fourth, the Board would clearly be charged with the resolution of
such policy issues as might be presented by the application, whereas
the ACRS deals with them only when they are inescapably bound up
in its assessment of safety. And finally, the Board would provide a
disappointed applicant with an adequate opportunity to meet the
Board's objections by evidence or argument and even to create a
formal record so that the applicant might seek judicial review of the
Board's final action, however minimal its chance of success might be.
If an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board were to be created, one
of its most challenging functions would be to experiment with different
modes of proceedings. If the documents should disclose a complex
case, the Board would doubtless resort to a prehearing conference.
There, informally but searchingly, it could explore with the applicant
and staff and any intervenors the problems that seemed troublesome and
decide what path its proceedings should follow after an initial public
hearing to subject the applicant's case for the construction permit to
the scrutiny of the Board and of technically qualified representatives
of the interested public. Sometimes, no doubt, the Board might decide
to postpone that hearing and refer the matter to the ACRS if its
opinion had not already been obtained. Often, one may hope, espe-
cially after the construction permit stage, the problems raised would
lend themselves to the "informal hearing procedure" which, under
AEC regulations, "may partake of the nature of a conference, or may
assume some of the aspects of a formal hearing .... ," 80 The regu-
lations now require hearings to be formal in "cases of adjudication"-
construed to include hearings in power and test reactor licensing
cases-"unless the parties otherwise agree." s" Agreement on in-
formality could, of course, be predicted more assuredly with a tech-
nically qualified Board presiding than with a hearing examiner. In-
deed, this characteristic of the Board opens the door to flexibility in
the conduct of hearings.
If the Board's probing should bring to the surface a serious dis-
agreement either between applicant and staff or between them both
and itself, then the Board might find it desirable to conduct a more
formal hearing on the issues involved.' Insofar as the issues involved
SoRules of Practice, 10 C.F.R. § 2.720 (1959).
8110 C.F.R. §2.708 (1959).
8 2 In some areas, notably liquor licensing, administrative or judicial hearings are
commonly used to review license denials made initially without hearings. See Byse,
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factual questions, resort might be had to formal examination and cross-
examination. If, despite the forensic efforts of applicant's counsel and
experts, the Board should still decide against the applicant, a formal
record would be available for an appeal to the courts. I see no reason
why a pattern similar to this might not be followed where the staff
and the applicant are in overt disagreement from the start or where an
intervenor has taken issue with them both. Neither situation should
change the basic nature of the proceeding. Its primary purpose still
would be to review the judgment on safety, not to settle the dispute.
The fourth and fifth of the criteria listed above are designed to
enhance the efficiency of the procedure by relieving the Board, the
AEC staff, and the applicant, from the necessity of acting at all times
through the medium of public sessions, with virtually all other com-
munication cut off between the decisionmaker and the other partici-
pants in the process. I have already noted the problems that have to
be taken into account in authorizing such relaxations. However, the
existence of an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board would facilitate the
solution of the first of these: it could readily relieve the AEC staff of
the sometimes difficult task of deciding when its own conclusions do
not require review.
D. Should a Technically Qualified Board Be Disqualified?
The expertise of the proposed Board appears to Commissioner
Olson not as an advantage but as a danger. He is troubled by "the
concept of having the Board, the decisional group, actually contribut-
ing to the evidence." 1 He explains that his "concept has always been
that the judge or adjudicator, marshaled and evaluated the evidence
rather than supplying testimony from his own omniscience. This is
the thing that bothers me," he continues, "the concept of having the
technical experts at the decisional point. If there is evidence, fact or
opinion, skimpy or solid, why can't we get it on the record?" And
he adds that "our experience has shown that it has gone on record
easily." "
Here Commissioner Olson reveals a viewpoint that may throw
some light on his satisfaction with the AEC's present procedures.
First, he seems to regard the decisionmaker in a reactor licensing case
as essentially a judge presiding impartially over a controversy brought
before his bench, not as an official on whom the nation is relying to
Opportunity to Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. P..' L. REv. 57, 72-87 (1952).
Discussions with the author, my colleague, Professor Clark Byse, have aided me in
considering the AEC's problems of hearing and review.
83 Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 382.
84Ibid.
1962l
362 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110:330
achieve as accurate an understanding of the risks created by a given
reactor as the state of the art and of scientific knowledge will permit
and to weigh those risks against the gains which that reactor, if li-
censed, could bring to the development of atomic power.
Second, Commissioner Olson apparently sees the problem in
terms of evidentiary fact rather than of trained judgment. If all the
facts are marshaled in evidence, including the expert opinions of scien-
tific witnesses, then he appears to believe that an intelligent and honest
judge can be relied on to reach as valid an answer to a question of
risk as the intelligent and honest scientist-decisionmaker. The prob-
lem is simply to make sure that everything relevant gets into the
record. But the crux of the problem is not what is in the record but
the "judge's" ability to evaluate the record-the facts, the scientific
theories, the projections of experiments, the opinions of scientific wit-
nesses. This ability a scientist who has won the respect of his peers
will have acquired over many years during a career of study, training,
and experience. Inevitably, in exercising it, he will draw on the
readings, observations, calculations, experiments, and experiences that
have gone into that career, using such insight, "feel," and powers of
logical analysis as he possesses. These cannot be put into a record,
nor should they be looked upon as evidence bootlegged into the case.
As Mr. Justice Holmes said of another body many years ago, "the
ijoard was created for the purpose of using its judgment and its
knowledge." "
In order to settle all the diverse disputes that arise among its
citizenry, a nation has to rely on the ability of its judiciary to move
from one type of controversy to another, handicapped sometimes by
lack of knowledge in evaluating unfamiliar data, but skilled always in
giving the parties to these controversies a fair chance to make their
positions understood and persuasive. But the United States has not
created the complex regulatory mechanisms of the Atomic Energy
Commission just to give parties who want to build and run reactors
a means of settling fairly their disputes with the Government or third
85 See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907). "Evidently also
the members [of the Nebraska State Board of Equalization and Assessment] or
some of them used their own judgment and their own knowledge . . . which they
had a right to use, if honest, however inarticulate the premises . . . [Their judg-
ments] express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up many
unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie beneath consciousness
without losing their worth." Id. at 596, 598. In some fields even a lay board may,
by prolonged experience, gain an expertness which they are free to draw upon even
though it conflicts with expert opinion of record. See McCarthy v. Industrial Conm'n,
194 Wis. 198, 203-04, 215 N.W. 824, 825-26 (1927): "It is scarcely too much to say
that [the Industrial Commission members] . . . are experts upon the subject [of
traumatic hernia] . . . If the testimony of these [expert] witnesses was contrary
to [the Commissioners'] . . . own expert knowledge . . . they were at liberty to
disregard it."
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parties. In discharging its regulatory responsibility, the Commis-
sion's prime duty is to give the nation reasonable assurance that the
reactors it licenses do not create undue risks to the communities that
are exposed to them. The basic question is how that assurance can
best be given.
V. TiE AEC's RULEMAKING FUNCTION
The AEC is equipped with rulemaking authority, unhampered
by any special statutory procedures. It has already issued a consider-
able volume of regulations, both procedural and substantive. Its out-
put of these has stepped up materially in recent months " after its
slowness in rulemaking had become the target of industry criticism."'
The AEC's rulemaking authority has been a significant factor in
the evaluation of the proposals developed in the three studies. Both
the AEC " and the Berman-Hydeman studies8" criticized the Joint
Committee staff position because it would leave final rulemaking power
in the Commission while giving final power to pass on license applica-
tions to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board it proposed. The
AEC study would retain both powers in the Commission while creating
a Director of Regulation reporting directly to the Commission as a
means of expediting the Commission's regulatory work." The Ber-
man-Hydeman study would shift both powers to its three-man Atomic
Energy Board, although permitting the Atomic Energy Adminis-
trator to sit and vote with the Board when it was passing upon pro-
posed rules. 1
The objections to the Joint Committee staff proposal seem to me
to overlook the very significant differences between evaluating the
safety merits of an individual reactor-the licensing task to be left to
the Board-and adopting regulations of general applicability to broad
categories of facilities-the rulemaking task to be left to the Com-
mission. In the former, the need for expert understanding of complex
hardware and physical processes is paramount; in the latter, the wise
8 6 Commissioner Olson, on June 15, 1961, testified: "Since January 1, 1961, we
have issued 10 effective regulations and amendments of regulations and 8 notices of
proposed regulations covering both procedural and substantive rules." Hearings on
Radiation Safety and Regulation 299.
87 See ibid.
88 Report on the Regulatory Program, in 2 JCAE STAFF STuDY 419.
89 BEMAN & HYDE mx 317-18.
00 The position of Director of Regulation has already been created and Harold
L. Price, for many years Director of the Division of Licensing and Regulation, has
been named Director of Regulation, Dr. C. K. Beck, Deputy Director, and Robert
Lowenstein, Director of the Division. AEC Release No. D-247, Sept. 25, 1961.
9 1 BERMAN & HYDEmAN 328. Surely an administrator would prefer to have no
vote than to be thus associated in board actions which he might oppose.
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balancing of the Government's dual objectives in a general rule. How-
ever, if the Commission should allow zeal, say, for reducing reactor
capital costs to lead it to propose standards of reactor construction
that the Board deemed unwise, the Board could make its voice heard
both before a rule was issued and afterward, if its views were not
heeded. Indeed, the issue might reach the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy and lead ultimately to legislation.92
It is borrowing trouble to assume conflicts of this sort. A more
realistic forecast would see the Board as a fruitful source of suggestions
for rules and an active contributor of ideas for their formulation. The
fact that rules grow naturally out of a process of case-by-case decision
does not mean that the same people who have decided the cases must
be the ones to formulate the rules. Indeed, our governmental tradition
is to the contrary.
I suspect, moreover, that current writings may tend to exaggerate
the significance of the AEC's rulemaking process. The Commission
has just been through a seven-year period of legislative development
in which it has gradually evolved a structure of basic rules which is
now nearly complete. Sometime in the future another important wave
of rulemaking may occur when the stabilization of the art over wide
areas will make it possible for standards of good practice in reactor
construction and operation to be cast into legislative form. When this
can be done, the burden of gradually evolving standards by case-by-case
decision will be lightened, although, if the technology continues to
break new ground, the latter process will certainly not come to an end.
In any event, extensive formulation of reactor safety standards in
regulations is sufficiently far away9" that its bearing on what is the
best administrative structure for, say, the next ten years, should not
be overemphasized.
VI. THE AEC's INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS
A factor stressed in both the AEC and the Joint Committee staff
studies in favor of keeping the licensing and other phases of the
regulatory function within the same organization that handles promo-
tion and development is ease of communication between the technical
staff in the Division of Licensing and Regulation and the staffs in the
92 The Board would report to the Joint Committee. I JCAE STAFF STUDY 70.
93 Relevant to the difficulty of generalizing reactor design experience into stand-
ards or "guides" is the testimony by Dr. C. K. Beck, Assistant Director of the Divi-
sion of Licensing and Regulation, in Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation
31: "No two reactors, even of the same generic type are sufficiently alike that ex-
trapolations on many of the parameters for one reactor can readily be made to
another. . . ." Even small differences in design details "can have disproportionately
large effects on . . . the performance . . . of a reactor."
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Division of Reactor Development and the National Laboratories. This
was thought important not only to promote exchange of information
relevant to both processes but to preserve the morale of the regulatory
staff which might otherwise regard itself as isolated from the main
stream of technological progress. The sharing of a common building
and common services which the Berman-Hydeman study proposed as
a means of mitigating the possible hazards of separate agencies seems
neither an adequate nor a durable safeguard.
There promises to be a continuing, perhaps a growing, need for
safety research directed to the design and operation of reactors." If
research staffs are not to be duplicated, most of the governmental work
will continue as heretofore to be done by the AEC's Division of Reactor
Development and the National Laboratories. Under the Berman-
Hydeman proposals, the separate Atomic Energy Board might ex-
perience difficulty in getting its safety research ideas implemented. In
the present AEC, the only independent voice for safety research is the
ACRS, which is preoccupied with reviewing an unending succession of
individual facilities. The creation of an Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board within the AEC would add another independent voice for
safety research. The Board could contribute ideas of its own and
could strongly reinforce the views of the Division of Licensing and
Regulation and the ACRS.
The Joint Committee staff proposal has been criticized by the
AEC and several commentators on the ground that it would place the
regulatory staff in an unsatisfactory role-that the staff would have
to try to serve both the Board and the Commission in whose chain
of command they would fall.95 But the staff would not have to serve
the Board any more than an attorney general's office has to serve the
courts before which its attorneys appear. To be sure, the relationships
between the Board and the staff would be less formal and the oppor-
tunities for useful interchange and cooperation outside the handling
of licensing cases would be much greater. However, a degree of
reciprocated independence on the part of staff and Board would be
desirable. Indeed, the fact that the Board, with the ultimate power of
decision, is not in a position to supervise and promote members of the
staff which carries out the initial investigation and evaluation should
make for sounder judgments by both bodies. Instead of a defect in
the Joint Committee staff's proposal, I view the separation of staff
and Board as a positive virtue.
04 See, as to directions for needed research, Reply From Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, to Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, April 8, 1961, in VIEWS AND COMMENTS 1-3.95 See, e.g., Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 300 (testimony of
Commissioner Olson).
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The substitution of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board pro-
posed by the Joint Committee staff for the present review by the ex-
aminer and, on petition, by the Commission, should make for more
efficient handling of regulatory work. As is contended by the Joint
Committee staff,"8 the greater accessibility, flexibility, and informality
of the Board in power and test reactor licensing should render the
Board proceedings more expeditious than those now prevailing, even
assuming that the latter are modified to eliminate superfluous hearings,
especially in simplifying the consideration of license amendments-the
"changes" problem which has been the source of much difficulty." As
has been noted above, it is, of course, possible that the availability
of a technically qualified Board would lead applicants to contest more
staff positions, but surely applicants cannot complain of licensing de-
lays caused by their own efforts to secure the reconsideration of de-
cisions reached at the staff level.
The Berman-Hydeman study proposes that the AEC--or, if the
Atomic Energy Board it advocates is created, the Board-should
serve as:
a focal point for coordinating the detailed responsibilities
of all Federal agencies [for radiation protection], for evaluat-
ing and providing general guidance on the emphasis and di-
rection of research in the field, for integrating state and fed-
eral programs of radiation protection, for serving as the initial
and principal point of contact for the states particularly with
respect to State legislation and rules, for developing and
promulgating basic guides, and for formulating broad na-
tional policy on radiation protection. 8
Once these roles were allocated to the AEC or the Board, the authors
would have the recently created interdepartmental Federal Radiation
Council 99 done away with.
I would agree with the authors that the Board they propose would
be the logical repository of the responsibilities they list and probably
one that could be charged with those duties more readily than the AEC
itself. But, unfortunately, the crisscrossing lines of jurisdiction, as-
piration, and operation, both among the federal agencies involved and
961 JCAE STAFF STUDY 74-75.
97 This problem, which merits more detailed consideration than is possible here,
is illustrated in Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor case, In the Matter of General
Elec. Co., 2 CCH ATOM. ENERGY L. REP. 1f 11236 (AEC Nov. 2, 1960), discussed
in 1 JCAE STAFF STUDY 35-37.
9 8 BERMAN & HYDE-AN 297-98.
P9 See generally STAFF OF JOINT CoMM. oN ATOMIC ENERGY, 86TH CONG., 2ND
SEss., HEARINGS ON "RADIATION PROTECTION CRITERIA AND STANDARDS: THEIm BASIS
A.mn USE"-SumMARY ANALYSIS 32-35 (Jt. Comm. Print 1961).
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between them and the states, will probably not soon be brought into
a nicely coordinated pattern of the sort Messrs. Berman and Hydeman
project. Both federal and state agencies must first have achieved more
experience in the administration of atomic energy programs and in
the regulation of atomic activities. Then they will know better what
they should be prepared to concede and what to fight for. The prob-
lem does not seem to me to have much bearing on the choices the
three studies currently pose.
VII. A COMPROMISE BILL
In the first session of the eighty-seventh Congress no choice was
made among the alternatives presented by the three studies. How-
ever, identical bills relating to the subject were introduced by Chairman
Holifield of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the House"o
and Vice-Chairman Pastore in the Senate.Y' No new hearings were
held on these bills, and they were not reported out. It seems likely
that this measure will be considered further at the present session of
Congress, although, of course, it may be supplanted by another pro-
posal. Accordingly, I shall deal with it briefly (terming the bills "the
Holifield-Pastore bill").
The bill would add a new section 191 to the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, authorizing the creation, at the option of the AEC, of a
three-man Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, two members to be
"technically qualified" and the third, "qualified in the conduct of ad-
ministrative proceedings." 102 If the AEC chose to exercise its option,
it could create either an ad hoc or a permanent Board, drawing per-
sonnel from its own staff, from other federal agencies, or from among
persons in private life. The Board would "conduct such hearings and
make such intermediate or final decisions as may be required" for
actions in licensing or authorization cases. °3
The bill would also amend section 189 (a) of the act to make a
public hearing for power and test reactors mandatory only with re-
spect to construction permit applications; at the operating license stage
a hearing, unless demanded by an intervenor, would be discretionary
with the Commission. Hearings on amendments to construction per-
mits or operating licenses might be dispensed with on thirty days' pub-
lished notice, and, if the Commission determines "that the amendment
100 H.R. 8708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
101 S. 2419, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
102 S. 2419, H.R. 8708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
103 Ibid. An "authorization" is the end product of "parallel proceedings!' ante-
cedent to the construction of a reactor to furnish power to a state, local, or co-
operative electric system, title to the reactor being retained by the AEC. The
Commission might delegate still other regulatory functions to the Board.
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involves no significant hazards consideration," it may dispense with
the notice." 4 Although, under the bill's amendment of section 182 (b),
ACRS review would still be required for power and test reactors at
both stages and might also be obtained by the Commission for other
facilities, nevertheless, the amended section would require ACRS re-
view of amendments to permits and licenses only upon specific reference
by the Commission..
0 5
The provisions with respect to hearings and ACRS review reflect
generally accepted views. Where the bill would leave a hearing dis-
cretionary, presumably the Commission or the Board could proceed by
press conference as Professor Davis has advocated, so long as every-
one concerned remained in agreement. Moreover, even where a hear-
ing is provided, less formal proceedings than have been the AEC's
standard operating practice may be possible. The "Bill Analysis"
which accompanied the measure included a paragraph of special interest
in this connection:
It would be expected that the Board, at least in initial
licensing cases, and in the absence of intervention, would be
free to consult with the technical staff to the extent permitted
by the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 1004(c)).
Similarly, it is hoped that the Board would follow procedures
appropriate to the resolution of complicated technical and
scientific questions, keeping in mind the necessity for pre-
serving a suitable record for review.'0 6
Most debatable are the bill's provisions giving the Commission
the option to substitute a board for the hearing examiner. This plan
calls to mind a brief colloquy between Mr. Ramey and Commissioner
Olson during the June hearing.'0 7 However, the idea that a board
104 S. 2419, H.R. 8708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (1961).
105 S. 2419, H.R. 8708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1961).
106 This "Bill Analysis" was prepared by the Joint Committee staff and circulated
informally among interested persons at the close of the congressional session last year.
It has not been published formally.
107 When Mr. Ramey took note of a report that the examiner had been given a
"technical adviser," Commissioner Olson acknowledged that this was true, crediting
discussions with Mr. Ramey for the idea and adding: "[The Commission] . . .
decided that it might be well to try this out, to give him a law clerk, so to speak
with a technical background who could go through the testimony, the narrative testi-
mony, the application, so that the examiner could discuss it with some technical
competence. We are trying this out. It has not been startlingly successful, but we are
continuing with it." Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 313-14. Mr.
Ramey, "somewhat humorously," as he remarked later in the hearing, then asked:
"What if you gave him one more technical assistant and called it a Board?"
Mr. OLSON. I think that has a lot of merit. I think that has a lot of
merit provided you would not clothe it with complete independence of au-
thority and make it separate but within the Commission. I think that has a
lot of merit.
Mr. RAmEy. So you have a little Board there. Then the other thing
that has happened since the Committee's staff report was that the Commission
established this rule of a certiorari procedure so that the decision of your
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might be created ad hoc was suggested earlier on the same occasion by
James M. Landis, then a Special Assistant to the President for Ad-
ministrative Agencies." 8 Mr. Landis had already recommended that,
if a board were created, it be appointed by the Commission rather
than by the President, as the Joint Committee staff had suggested, and
that its decisions be subject to discretionary review by the Commis-
sion,0 9 a point also stressed by Commissioner Olson."'
Obviously whether one would view the adoption of the plan em-
bodied in the Holifield-Pastore bill as a major step forward in meeting
the AEC's facilities licensing problem would depend on whether one
thought the more serious defect to be corrected was the present lack of
an adequate review by a technically qualified body or whether, instead,
one were chieflly concerned by the dual functions of the Commissioners.
The Board, if employed by the Commission, should materially
strengthen the technical review process, at least if the Commission were
to appoint scientists and engineers of high standing to it. That the
Commission could enlist such persons on an ad hoc basis for a difficult
case seems likely; probably it could not do so for a permanent Board,
given the extent to which the Board would be subordinated to the
Commission.
The very fact of subordination would tend to leave the Commis-
sion wearing its two hats, to the detriment of public confidence in the
disinterestedness of its decisions. However, if it were to make the
Board's decision final in a given case, this might provide insulation
enough from its policies, especially if the men the Commission chose
for the Board enjoyed high reputations in their respective fields.
If the Board took full advantage of any relaxation in procedural
formalities permitted by the Commission, the use of the Board might
well prove more expeditious than the use of the hearing examiner.
However, if the Commission used hearing examiners who were prone
to "dueprocessitis," as Professor Davis puts it, to serve as presiding
officers and if the Commission were liberal in accepting petitions for
review of the Board's decisions, the main procedural effect of the
Board's creation would be to substitute a new layer for the existing
one in the decisional process.
Hearing Examiner or . . . your Hearing Examiner and two technical
assistants, is final so far as the applicant is concerned.
Mr. OLSON. Subject to our right to review on our own motion.
Id. at 314.
108 Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation 246 (testimony of James M.
Landis).
109 Mr. Landis was the source of the suggestions reported in 1 JCAE STAFF
STuny 69, 70 nn.2, 3.
110 See note 107 .upra.
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From the foregoing it seems evident that an appraisal of the
Holifield-Pastore bill as a compromise between the views of the Joint
Committee staff and the Commission"' must await a reading of the
Commission's reaction to the plan. The Commission could render
such a plan a step backward or it could make the plan an instrument
of progress. In any event, it seems clear that the Holifield-Pastore
bill, if considered at this session, would provide an excellent
vehicle for another careful look at decisionmaking by the AEC in
nuclear facilities licensing.
111 The recently published Hearings on Radiation Safety and Regulation app. 7,
at 427, contain a letter dated July 24, 1961, from AEC Chairman Seaborg to Joint
Committee Chairman Holifield, proposing amendments to §§ 189(a) and 182(b) to
limit the mandatory public hearing and ACRS reference requirements to the con-
struction permit stage. A like letter, dated July 27, 1961, presented a draft subsection
for § 189 to authorize the Commission to "designate two or more persons to serve
with a duly appointed hearing examiner as a board to conduct hearings and render
a decision in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act . . . ." Chairman
Seaborg explained that the board would be "established on an ad hoc basis for indi-
vidual cases" with authority "commensurate with that of a hearing examiner." In
his reply, dated Aug. 7, 1961, Chairman Holifield indicated that, although he saw no
objection to such use of a hearing examiner, the AEC might "wish to try outside
people also." Accordingly the authorization was recast in the broader terms indicated
in the text above as a new § 191. The letter also transmitted broadening language
for the amendments to § 189(a) and 182(b).
